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Abstract
Ever since the spectacular boom and bust cycle of the Spanish real estate industry,
endemic corruption at the local level has become a widely recognized problem in the
national public discourse. In an effort to expose an under-explored political determi-
nant, this paper investigates the effect of local and regional alignment in fomenting
corruption at the Spanish municipal level. To do so, we construct an ample panel
dataset on the prevalence of corrupt practices by local politicians, which is employed
to test the possible impact of partisan alignment in three consecutive joint munici-
pal and regional elections. Findings show aligned municipalities to be more corrupt
than non-aligned ones, an effect that is further associated with absolute majorities
at both levels of government and higher capital transfers. By contrast, we also show
that “throwing the rascals out” could be an effective strategy for curbing the corrupt
practices of alignedmunicipalities. This indicates that the democratic political process
may be effective in corruption control if agreements can be reached to remove corrupt
politicians or parties from power.
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1 Introduction
Political corruption andmalfunctioninggovernments are awidespreadphenomenonon
a worldwide level. 1 International organizations regularly highlight that the diversion
of public funds for private benefit is probably one of the most important threats to the
stability ofmany developed economies (Kaufmann et al. 2004, 2009),with estimations
equating the overall cost to be more than 5% of global GDP (OECD 2013), and
increasing by about 10% the average cost of doing business (World Economic Forum
2008). Other studies have looked at the detrimental consequences for economic growth
(Mendez and Sepulveda 2006), investment (Mauro 1995;Wei 2000), and international
trade (de Jong and Bogmans 2011), to name only a few.2
Contrasting with the relatively well-documented economic outcomes, empirical
evidence on the political determinants of corruption still presents many unknowns,
according to surveys by Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2008) and Dimant and Tosato (2018).
In particular, the role played by decentralization is regarded as uncertain, where some
find federalism to be an important element in containing corruption (Dell’Anno and
Teobaldelli 2015; Villalonga 2018), while others highlight the potential multiplication
of corruption possibilities through decentralized administrations (Fisman and Gatti
2002; Gerring and Thacker 2004; Erlingsson et al. 2008; Fan et al. 2009; Albornoz
and Cabrales 2013). Related to this, the frequent re-election of corrupt politicians also
highlights the complex interplay of different incentives at work in national, regional,
and local electoral processes, where punishment of corrupt incumbents is not always
the default option (Miller 1999; Reed 1999; Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Ferraz and
Finan 2008, 2011; Jiménez et al. 2013). Similar evidence has also been found at
the Spanish local level by Costas-Pérez et al. (2012), Jiménez and García (2018),
or Fernández-Vázquez et al. (2016), where the effects of news coverage, political
ideology, and income seem to play crucial roles for electoral decisions.3
Following this literature, uncovering the political determinants of corruption is key
to understanding the role that institutions play in its emergence. In this paper, we
examine whether ruling a regional and local government at the same time, henceforth
partisan alignment, has an impact on political corruption among local governments in
1 It is important to distinguish between political and bureaucratic corruption (Amundsen 1999). The latter
solely arises from unlawful behavior by bureaucrats in the public administration. The former may arise
likewise, and in addition, when legislation is tailored to benefit politicians. See Fitzpatrick (2007) for a
comprehensive definition.
2 See Perspectives (1998) for a detailed description of the pervasive impact of corruption.
3 In turn, consensus on the negative impact of corruption for public confidence in democratic systems and
political trust seems to be substantial (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bowler and Karp 2004; Warren 2004;
Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2018; Sanz et al. 2020).
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Spain. To the best of our knowledge, this possibility has not been considered to date
in the relevant literature, and our paper is the first to do so empirically.
Theoretically, alignment could impact corruption in several different ways: On the
one hand, alignment may induce corruption, and several overlapping mechanisms
could be at work. First, a variety of studies have already shown that aligned munici-
palities benefit frommore favorable budgetary decisions taken at a higher government
level for countries as diverse as Albania (Case 2001), Brazil (Brollo and Nannicini
2012), France (Fabre 2014), India (Arulampalam et al. 2009; Dey and Sen 2016),
Italy (Bracco et al. 2015; Carozzi and Repetto 2016), Portugal (Migueis 2013), Spain
(Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008; Curto-Grau et al. 2018), and the United States
(Levitt and Snyder Jr 1995; Larcinese et al. 2006). According to this literature, the
possibility of corruption could increase with the number of public programs that are
being implemented at the local level, a possibility which is even higher for aligned
municipalities. Seen from this point of view, public sector corruption is simply a func-
tion of the available transfers that can be diverted (Holcombe 2013). Second, and
following a very similar logic, aligned municipalities may be better able to “afford”
to be corrupted. That is, any negative effects from corruption for local public finances
would be compensated for by the comparatively higher transfers from aligned regional
governments.
Third, if local politicians benefit from better connections via alignment when
obtaining public contracts and projects with firms, private sector-related corruption
possibilities could be more abundant for politicians of aligned municipalities (cf. Gut-
mann and Lucas 2018). Finally, a lack of monitoring from upper-tier governments
and a tendency to turn a blind eye toward corruption when the same party controls
both levels may create incentives for local politicians to seize corruption opportuni-
ties more readily when they are available. Essentially, corruption here constitutes a
potential alternative for regional administrations to reward aligned (and loyal) local
governments.
On the other hand, the effect of partisan alignment on local level corruption could
be negative, if regional governments are better able to influence aligned municipalities
to behave according to the law by more credibly threatening them, an influence which
cannot be exercised in the case of non-aligned municipalities. For example, via the
threat of removing party support, forcing corrupt politicians to resign from office
or leave the party, etc. Finally, there may be no association at all with regard to
monitoring if regional governments behave similarly toward aligned and non-aligned
local governments.
In the following, we investigate the important question of whether partisan align-
ment impacts corruption at the local level, constructing a dataset on corrupt practices
frompress news published over a period of 15 years,matching itwith local and regional
electoral data over three consecutive electoral cycles between 1999 and 2011. Find-
ings show that alignedmunicipalities are significantlymore associatedwith corruption
than non-aligned ones. The association is stronger where regional governments enjoy
an absolute majority, and in municipalities receiving higher capital transfers from
regional governments, which is very much in line with previous studies on the allo-
cation of transfers to aligned municipalities in Spain (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro
2008; Curto-Grau et al. 2018). By contrast, we find that “throwing the rascals out”
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may be an effective strategy for curbing the corrupt practices of aligned municipalities
when allegedly corrupt mayors or parties are actually removed from power. In the tra-
dition of Olson (1982), this actually suggests that a certain level of political instability
is desirable, potentially making it more difficult for corrupt politicians to completely
dominate a local political system. Finally, findings are robust to the inclusion of addi-
tional controls, several estimationmethods, different definitions of alignment, and also
to falsification tests.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 outlines the relevant
institutional setting in which Spanish local and regional elections take place. Section 3
describes our data and the research design in detail, while Sect. 4 presents the results.
Finally, Sect. 5 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Institutional setting
Spain is a parliamentary democracy with three elected levels of government: central,
regional, and local. Geographically, the territory is divided into 17 regions and more
than 8000 municipalities.4 About 84% of all municipalities have fewer than 5000
inhabitants, accounting for roughly just 15% of the entire population.
In Spanish federalism, regional governments are in charge of important spending
responsibilities, such as public education, health care, and social welfare more gener-
ally, including important transfers to the local level. On the local level, responsibilities
increase with population size, which is recognized in the form of higher per capita
transfers for larger municipalities and a greater tax autonomy. Generally, municipali-
ties are in charge of providing basic services such as public transport, civil protection,
environmental services, and urban development. The latter was strongly associated
with most local level corruption in Spain during the real estate boom of the 1990s
and 2000s (Costas-Pérez et al. 2012). The funding of urban development expenditure
depends heavily on discretionary grants provided by upper-tier government levels,
which represents an overall one third of total local revenues.5 The other two thirds are
self-financed by municipal revenues, mainly stemming from local taxes.
Politically, Spanishmunicipalities are ruled by an indirectly electedmayor (alcalde)
and a directly elected city council (ayuntamiento).6 For the latter, closed list elections
are held simultaneously in all of the country’s municipalities, with more than a total
of 66000 local representatives proportionally elected every four years. Interestingly,
most regional elections (13 out of 17) are held the same day, with only four historically
determined regions constituting important exceptions to this rule. Especially in some
of these linguistic minority regions, regional parties have also played key roles in local
politics. However, from the early 1990s to around 2015, two national level parties were
4 There is also an intermediate upper-local layer for purely administrative purposes, called the Diputación,
in those regions with more than one province—an important exception to this rule are the Canary Islands.
5 As an illustrative example, municipalities received capital transfers from the central (10%), regional
(almost 50%), and upper-local (almost 25%) governments in 2004. Source: http://www.minhafp.gob.es/
es-ES/CDI/Paginas/SistemasFinanciacionDeuda/InformacionEELLs/HaciendasLocalesencifras.aspx (last
access: March 3, 2021).
6 See (AA.PP. 2008) for a complete report of the Spanish local government system.
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predominant in most local political systems: the social-democratic Spanish Socialist
Workers’ Party (PSOE), and the Christian-conservative People’s Party (PP).
Electing mayors may require coalitions by two or more parties, but only about one
third of the municipalities under observation in our data were ruled by a party without
an absolute majority. Additionally, local coalitions are also formed along ideological
lines inmost cases (Curto-Grau et al. 2018).7 City councils constitute a small represen-
tative democracy with majority voting, where mayors act as the highest representative
authority, responsible for local government and administration. Nevertheless, mayors
can be removed through a no-confidence vote (moción de censura), if another candi-
date has the majority support of the council. Given the closed-list electoral system,
parties are highly disciplined, giving mayors a large degree of discretionary power,
especially when parties enjoy an absolute majority. In addition, citizens do not have
relevant ways of participating in the council decisions, and the degree of transparency
in each municipality depends heavily on the judgments of local representatives.
In fact, the institutional reaction to the surge in local corruption shows quite well
how difficult it is to exercise effective political and judicial control. Before the Spanish
real estate bubble burst in 2008 this topic was hardly on the agenda at all. Individual
journalists and certain media outlets deserve credit for systematically exposing it
initially, which probably also drove the electoral reaction of many citizens (Costas-
Pérez et al. 2012), for whom corruption became an increasing concern sometime after
2011. It took years for political parties and the judicial system to react effectively
to these allegations though, substantially contributing to the current revolution of the
Spanish party system at a time when many judicial processes linked to corruption
scandals in this dataset are effectively still ongoing.
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data
Empirical corruption research always faces the problem of obtaining data on activities
that are, for themost part, also considered formally illegal. In this paper, we circumvent
this limitation by constructing a dataset containing newsmedia information on corrupt
practices at the Spanish municipal level between 1999 and 2011. In particular, we
codify two corruption studies, each carried out by one of the main newspapers in
the country, namely the left-wing El Pais and the right-wing El Mundo for three
consecutive local elections in 1999, 2003, and 2007.8 We further follow the approach
by Saiz and Simonsohn (2013), employing internet-guided searches to complete the
database.
Generally speaking, the objective is to identify municipalities in which local politi-
cians were involved in scandals relating to fraud, misuse of public funds, bribery, etc.
Knack (2006) has effectively referred to this type of corruption as “state capture,” dis-
7 If no candidate is elected by absolute majority in the first round, the first list-placed representative whose
party obtained the most votes in the election is appointed as mayor.
8 Both studies provide very similar information. See Alternativas (2007) and El Mundo (2006) for more
details. See also Jerez Darias et al. (2012) for a geographical description of local corruption scandals.
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tinguishing it from petty corruption. In the following, we checked on a case-by-case
basis to identify the electoral period during which the corruption scandal appearing in
the media had actually occurred, irrespective of the point in time when citizens had
access to information on these practices. The corresponding outcome variable is then
simply defined as a dummy that is equal to 1, if we observe a corruption case for a
certain municipality during a specific electoral period, and 0 otherwise. The exact def-
inition of corruption employed, and a more extensive description about the resulting
data is found in Appendix A of ESM.
In order to estimate the effect of partisan alignment on corruption, we match the
information on corruption with municipality-level panel data, employing three differ-
ent sources of information: First, results for the three consecutive local elections in
1999, 2003, and 2007, provided by the Spanish Interior Ministry.9 With this infor-
mation, we calculate vote shares obtained by the incumbent mayor’s party for each
municipality and several dummies capturing whether (i) the ruling party enjoyed an
absolute majority, (ii) the incumbent was re-elected, and whether (iii) there was a
change in the local government during the electoral period.10 Furthermore, we col-
lected data on mayors’ individual characteristics, namely gender, age, education, and
experience in office. Finally, corresponding data for all regional elections was directly
collected from each regional government. Consequently, the main variable of interest
“partisan alignment” is a dummy equal to 1, if the same party controls the local council
and the regional government for an electoral period, and 0 otherwise.11
Second,wecollect budgetarydata for eachmunicipality from theyearly local budget
survey conducted by the Spanish Ministry of Finance.12 This survey contains detailed
information on sources of local income and expenditures programs. Specifically, we
introduce per capitameasures of direct and indirect taxes, current- and capital transfers
from other government layers, and property income.13
Third, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics for a wide range of munic-
ipalities are obtained from La Caixa, in order to control for additional municipal
characteristics that are likely to be correlated with corrupt practices.14 This set
includes: unemployment, population growth, the number of savings banks, and the
total number of small businesses in the municipality. Given the lack of these data for
smaller communities, we had to restrict the sample employed in the empirical anal-
ysis to municipalities above 1000 inhabitants, giving us a final sample of 9733 total
observations for the years 1999–2011.
9 Source: http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/home.html (last access: March 3, 2021).
10 The latter may happen due to a change of mayor within the same party, or also because of a change in
the party ruling the municipality.
11 In addition, we also define “coalition alignment,” a broader definition of alignment being equal to 1, if a
party ruling amunicipality is also in a coalition running the corresponding regional government, independent
of its position within that coalition. We show in Appendix B.3 of ESM that our results prove robust to this
broader definition of alignment.
12 Source: http://serviciostelematicosext.minhap.gob.es/SGCAL/entidadeslocales/.
13 Variables are computed dividing the average for the four years in each electoral cycle over the total
population at the beginning of each electoral period. In all cases, we consider the electoral year as the last
year of the cycle.
14 Source: Economic Yearbook of Spain - http://www.anuarioeco.lacaixa.comunicacions.com.
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Table 1 shows summary statistics for all variables employed in the empirical anal-
ysis, further separating means for aligned and non-aligned municipalities. For both
groups,P values indicate whether differences of subgroups are statistically significant.
Overall, aligned municipalities tend to be more corrupt and more concentrated in PP
or PSOE hands. In addition, these same local governments seem to be politically more
stable, meaning that there is a higher probability of incumbents’ being re-elected, and
a lower probability of the ruling party being ousted during an electoral term.
Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of our 561 Spanish municipalities
affected by corruption for the period from July 1999 to May 2011, distinguishing
between aligned and non-aligned cases by color. Each dot represents a municipality
with one or more corruptions cases, with the size of dots visually illustrating the
number of total cases by municipality. Of these, 452 municipalities experienced just
one corruption case, 82 in the first electoral period, 234 in the second, and 136 in
the third. A total of 96 municipalities experienced a corruption case in two different
electoral cycles, and 13 in all three electoral cycles considered.15
The concentration of cases in the second and third electoral period shows just how
much municipal corruption in Spain is linked to the real-estate boom of the early to
mid 2000’s, which came to an abrupt end around 2008. Furthermore, the map also
makes clear how corruption cases are more concentrated along the Mediterranean
coast, the South, in the areas around Madrid, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in
the north-western region of Galicia. Most importantly for our estimation strategy,
alignment seems to matter for corruption, but the territorial distribution of aligned
cases is clearly similar to that of non-aligned ones.
3.2 Empirical strategy
The outcome variable Corrirt is defined as a dummy that is equal to 1, if municipality
i presented a corruption case in region r and period t . Similarly, the treatment of
interest, partisan alignment, is equal to 1 when the same party controls both the local
city council and the regional government. The objective is to identify the effect of
treatment (alignment) on the prevalence of municipal corruption. However, corruption
cannot be simultaneously observed in the event that the municipality is aligned, and
in the counterfactual event in which it is not, leading to the fundamental problem of
causal inference.
In the following, we let dummy Airt be equal to 1 for treated municipalities, 0
otherwise. The effect is then estimated as the difference in the mean probability of
corruption between municipalities that are aligned (Airt = 1) and those that are not
(Airt = 0), using the following model:
Corrirt = αi + γt + γt ∗ θr + βAirt + X ′ir tδ + εir t (1)
where the error term εir t is clustered at the local level. Equation (1) provides infor-
mation on the impact of partisan alignment on political corruption, independent of the
party ruling the municipality and the date when the scandal appeared in the media. The
15 Note that the map excludes 29 cases in the Canary Islands for optical reasons.
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Table 1 Summary statistics by partisan alignment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Partisan
alignment
Yes No P value
Outcome variable
Corruption 0.070 0.082 0.057 0.000
Electoral variables (local)
Participation rate 0.743 0.745 0.739 0.002
Vote share current incumbent 0.483 0.508 0.455 0.000
PP in power (local) 0.311 0.360 0.256 0.000
PSOE in power (local) 0.417 0.533 0.288 0.000
PP or PSOE in power (local) 0.728 0.893 0.544 0.000
Other party in power (local) 0.080 0.000 0.168 0.000
=1 if mayor’s change (different party) 0.061 0.041 0.082 0.000
=1 if mayor’s change (same party) 0.115 0.103 0.128 0.000
=1 if incumbent re-elected 0.533 0.578 0.483 0.000
=1 if absolute majority at local level 0.644 0.734 0.544 0.000
Mayors’ characteristics
=1 if female 0.122 0.125 0.119 0.349
Mayor’s age 47.280 47.351 47.200 0.440
Mayor’s education 5.449 5.421 5.480 0.141
=1 if superior education 0.421 0.419 0.423 0.647
Mayor’s number of terms in office 2.210 2.269 2.145 0.000
=1 if above median terms 0.579 0.595 0.560 0.000
Electoral variables (regional)
PP in power (regional) 0.353 0.360 0.346 0.131
PSOE in power (regional) 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.987
PP-PSOE in power (regional) 0.886 0.893 0.879 0.025
Other party in power (regional) 0.114 0.107 0.121 0.025
=1 if absolute majority at regional level 0.587 0.663 0.504 0.000
=1 if concurrent elections 0.549 0.565 0.532 0.001
Income variables (Euro per capita)
Direct taxes 299.739 335.151 259.531 0.481
Indirect taxes 60.004 67.250 51.777 0.451
Current transfers 323.624 349.549 294.188 0.316
Property income 31.689 36.669 26.034 0.251




(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Partisan
alignment
Yes No P value
Baseline characteristics
=1 if 1999 electoral cycle 0.335 0.351 0.318 0.000
=1 if 2003 electoral cycle 0.330 0.315 0.347 0.001
=1 if 2007 electoral cycle 0.335 0.334 0.335 0.904
Population (log) 8.350 8.354 8.346 0.754
Population gr. rate −0.038 −0.033 −0.043 0.000
Unemployment 0.064 0.066 0.062 0.000
Unemployment gr. rate −0.188 −0.186 −0.190 0.580
Number of saving banks 6.465 7.252 5.574 0.040
Number of small business 283.364 306.042 257.750 0.092
N. Observations 9733 5114 4619
Column (1):Means for allmunicipalities. Columns (2–3):Means for aligned and non-alignedmunicipalities.




Note: Small dots = one case. Medium dots = two cases. Large dots = three cases.
Fig. 1 Local corruption cases by alignment. Note Small dots = one case. Medium dots = two cases. Large
dots = three cases
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parameter of interest in this equation is β, which captures the change in the probability
of observing corruption that is due to partisan alignment, holding other factors fixed.16
In this equation, αi and γt are municipality and electoral term fixed effects, controlling
for (i) any time-invariant characteristic that may have an influence both on corruption
and the alignment status of municipalities and (ii) the growth of corruption common
to all municipalities. In addition, we further include the term γt ∗ θr , to account for the
possibility that changes in political support within regions could be correlated with
changes in corruption in that same region’s municipalities. Finally, Xit is a vector of
controls variables, all described and summarized in Table 1 of the previous subsection.
If alignment preferences are a decisive factor for determining the outcome ofmunic-
ipal elections, this estimation strategy would be subject to reverse causality. On the
margin, we do not consider this to be the case, relying on the following reasoning: First,
the high degree of overall uncertainty in amostly parallel electoral process. Sincemost
regional and local elections are held the same day, two specific results have to coin-
cide for a certain alignment outcome to materialize.17 Second, the general behavior of
voters, which is seldom guided by rational or strategic considerations of the kind, but
seems rather to be driven by expressive behavior (Caplan 2011). Third, and coinciding
with these two arguments, the specific behavior of Spanish voters, who traditionally
reward their ideologically most preferred party in regional elections, while voting for
the platform of the most highly valued politician in local elections, even if these two
do not coincide in ideological terms (Sanz Cazorla 2007; Delgado 2010).
Obviously, this strategy cannot fully exclude the possibility that the election of
an aligned (or a non-aligned) local leader is driven by some external time-variant
factor that also affects the possibility of observing corruption. Even if voters do not
care about alignment at all, alignment may be correlated with some other unknown
variable that could in turn affect corruption, which we cannot fully control for in our
empirical model. Notwithstanding, our estimation strategy implies that alignment is
conditionally mean independent of the unobserved term after including all the control
variables, and many of the robustness checks presented in Appendix B of ESM are
conducted to exclude related endogeneity issues as much as possible. In a nutshell,
while we consider reverse causality to be an unlikely driver of the findings, it is
impossible to fully exclude endogeneity concerns in our framework, although we find
no indications that such issues severely bias our baseline results in a significant way.
In order to shed some light regarding the circumstances under which corruption is
more likely to occur, we further assess whether the intensity of local political corrup-
tion depends on a series of heterogeneous effects, namely: the logarithm of per capita
capital transfers to the municipality, absolute majorities at the local and regional level,
or changes in local governments between electoral periods, where τ denotes the cor-
16 We choose to estimate a linear probability model instead of probit or logit models for several reasons.
First, it is not convenient to use a probit model with fixed effects and small T, due to the incidental parameters
problem (Greene 2004). Second, the assumptions needed to estimate a logit model with fixed effects are
unlikely to hold and, in addition, they do not provide marginal effects. Third, using an LPM is a suitable
alternative given that the main purpose is to estimate the average causal effect, and not to predict it.
17 Note that the latter does not include other overlapping (ideological) preferences that might indirectly
influence alignment results, which are in turn driven by external events, such as an economic crisis. The
latter would be quasi-random for the purpose of its impact on corruption, when employing election and
municipality fixed effects, as we do here.
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responding variable in our estimated equation.
Corrirt = αi + γt + γt ∗ θr + β0Airt + β1τir t + β2τir t ∗ Airt + X ′ir tδ + εir t (2)
In Eq. (2), the coefficient β0 now captures the effect of partisan alignment for
the subgroup of municipalities (i) receiving lower capital transfers per inhabitant, (ii)
without absolute majorities (local or regional), or (iii) politically stable municipali-
ties, respectively. Correspondingly, β1 captures the change in the probability of being
corrupt that is due to (i) higher capital transfers per inhabitant, (ii) enjoying abso-
lute majorities, or (iii) local political instability. Finally, β2 measures the difference
in the effect of partisan alignment between the subgroups of municipalities (i) with
higher/lower capital transfers, (ii) with and without absolute majorities, or (iii) with
and without a change in local government during the course of an electoral period.18
An important concern is that some of these characteristics could further be corre-
lated with the alignment treatment. For example, given the evidence that alignment
might cause a higher level of capital transfers (e.g., Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro
2008), identification is not clear in this case. Similarly, alignment and absolute major-
ity status are jointly determined in elections, and aligned municipalities are also much
more likely to present an absolute majority than non-aligned ones. As a consequence,
these heterogeneous effects cannot be clearly identified and should rather be taken as
indicative. Nonetheless, we consider them to be important for highlighting the circum-
stances under which Spanish municipal corruption is more (or less) likely to occur,
despite not being able to make any definite causal claims here.
4 Results
4.1 Main findings
Table 2 shows estimates from Eq. (1), modifying the number of controls as we move
from columns (1) to (6). Column (1) only includes the treatment variable and munic-
ipality fixed effects (FE), finding that partisan alignment significantly increases the
probability of a corruption case occurring by about 2 percentage points. Taking into
account that the mean level of corruption is 5.7% for non-aligned municipalities, this
is a notable difference. Column (2) adds electoral cycle FE, while the specification
with municipality, electoral, and electoralt × regionr FE is presented in column (3).
Columns (4) to (6) repeat specifications from (1) to (3), further including all controls
described in Sect. 3.2, confirming our previous finding. Focusing on themost complete
specification in the last column, estimates represent a 29.82% increase in corruption
for aligned municipalities, with respect to non-aligned ones.
18 We provide two addition tests in the empirical analysis. First, we test the effect on corruption of aligned
municipalities with (i) higher capital transfers per inhabitant, (ii) enjoying absolute majorities, or (iii) local
political instability (β1 + β2 = 0). Second, we also test the effect on corruption of being aligned for
municipalities with (i) higher capital transfers per inhabitant, (ii) enjoying absolute majorities, or (iii) local

























































































































































































































































































































































































According to these results, partisan alignment seems to create important incentives
for local governments to engage in political corruption. We can only speculate on
the underlying political mechanisms, but it is rather likely that these are similar to
those highlighted in the literature on alignment and transfers. Here, local politicians
often benefit from better connections (Curto-Grau et al. 2018), which could potentially
lead to a lack of monitoring from regional governments. Of course, in this case we
are implicitly assuming that regional administrations have, at least in principle, an
interest in curbing local level corruption. This might not necessarily be the case.
Previous results from the alignment-transfers literature also suggest a non-negligible
amount of coordination effort in allocating extra transfers to aligned municipalities
(Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008).
In an effort to uncover some of the mechanisms that create incentives for corrup-
tion at the municipal level, we further study a series of heterogeneous effects based on
Eq. (2). First, Table 3 shows the association of partisan alignment with local political
corruption depending on the level of capital transfers. Columns (1) to (6) repeat dif-
ferent models from Table 2. Top panel A shows results when calculating (per capita)
capital transfers on the basis of the mean value for the whole electoral period, and
bottom panel B only for the last two years. Marginal effects for the interaction term
are also shown.
Wefind solid indications that alignedmunicipalitieswith higher capital transfers are
significantlymore corrupt, pointing in the direction of individual politicians potentially
taking advantage of the connections created by political alignment. Moreover, the
effect is stronger when using capital transfers calculated as the mean value over the
last two years of the electoral cycle, which is consistent with the idea that these types of
discretionary transfers take on more importance just before the next local elections.19
Second, Table 4 highlights the association of partisan alignment with local political
corruption for absolute majorities, where columns (1) to (6) again repeat the different
models. Here, top panel A shows results for absolute majorities on the local level,
while bottom panel B for absolute majorities on the regional level, each with the
corresponding marginal effects.
In both cases, we find solid indications that absolute majorities play a significant
role in political corruption of aligned municipalities. Notwithstanding, on a purely
numerical level, absolutemajorities at the local level (panelA) seem toplay a somewhat
less important role than absolute majorities at the regional level (panel B).20 This
would offer some support to our speculation on the specific importance of monitoring
from regional administrations in curbing local level corruption. If there is no coalition
party in a regional government to contend with, incentives to curtail such practices in
politically aligned municipalities are substantially reduced.
19 Notice that receiving more capital transfers under alignment only matter for corruption when focusing
on the last two years of the electoral cycle, as indicated by the test β1 +β2 = 0 in both panels. By contrast,
the effect of being aligned for municipalities receiving more capital transfers (β0 + β2) is similar in both
panels.
20 Notice that both the effect of having absolute majorities under alignment (β1 + β2 = 0) and the effect
of being aligned under absolute majorities (β0 + β2 = 0) yield similar results, although again the effects












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Third, in Table 5 we assess the association of partisan alignment with local political
corruption, dependent on the municipal level of political stability. Top panel A shows
results for a change in mayors during an electoral term, where the new mayor is from
a different party. In turn, bottom panel B shows results for a change in mayors during
an electoral term, when the new mayor is from the same party.
Interestingly, we find a convincing indication in panel A that “throwing the rascals
out” could be a rather effective strategy in curbing the corrupt practices of politically
aligned municipalities, but only if the new mayor comes from a different party. In
turn, simply changing mayors seems to be an ineffective way of reducing local level
corruption, as indicated in panel B. These results bear an important relation to a
notable strain of literature starting with Olson (1982), and more recently Holcombe
(2018), where it is argued that some degree of political instability might actually be
beneficial in an economic–institutional sense, making it comparatively more difficult
for corruption, rent-seeking, and special interests to dominate a political system. Of
course, the success of such a removal strategy at the local level will crucially depend
on whether the necessary political agreements can be reached to oust corrupt mayors
and their parties from power.
4.2 Robustness and research design validity
4.2.1 Robustness checks
All of the main findings are robust to a variety of alternative sample selection criteria
and a series of robustness checks. These are detailed in Appendix B of ESM, while this
section provides a brief summary of the most relevant points, further demonstrating
the validity of our research design.
First, we show robustness checks with respect to alternative estimation strategies:
Appendix B.1 of ESM employs a “close-race” regression discontinuity design (RDD)
in the spirit of Brollo and Nannicini (2012), where we compare municipalities in
which aligned candidates barely won the elections to those in which they barely lost,
following the procedure employed in Curto-Grau et al. (2018). Moreover, Appendix
B.2 of ESM employs control variables to make treatment and outcome independent
through matching techniques. Our findings prove robust to both strategies.21
In addition, we check the robustness of (i) our treatment variable definition in
AppendixB.3 ofESMand (ii) of the control group inAppendixB.4 ofESM, employing
different techniques. Findings show that our results are also robust to using as treatment
“coalition alignment,” to using additionally other possible forms of alignment (i.e.,
local–national, or regional–national), and also to changing the definition of the control
group.
21 Ideally, we would observe corruption when a municipality is treated (Y1i j t ), and when the same munici-
pality is not treated (Y0i j t ). In this case, one could average the difference between Y1i j t and Y0i j t across all
municipalities to obtain a measure of the average impact of the treatment. However, this ideal experiment is
almost never available in observational data. Given that randomization is not possible either, we rely on the
matching estimator to construct the correct sample counterpart for the missing information on the treated
outcomes had they not been treated. Ideally, the only remaining difference between the two groups is the
alignment status when employing this strategy.
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Another potential limitation of our estimates is the inclusion of municipalities ruled
by local parties, because, by definition, they are always non-aligned.As a consequence,
one may be concerned that the alignment effect is not well captured if municipalities
ruled by local parties are systematically different from aligned ones, for instance, in
terms of population size. We address this issue in Appendix B.5 of ESM, where we
re-estimate Eq. (1) in a sub-sample of municipalities, excluding those ruled by local
parties. In addition, we further restrict our sample by keeping only thosemunicipalities
ruled by the twomain parties in the country, PP and PSOE, to avoid potential alignment
effects from regional parties. In both sub-samples, the impact on corruption is actually
slightly stronger.
The main regression models were further re-estimated, excluding the four regions
with different electoral calendars, namely Andalucía, Catalonia, Galicia, and the
Basque Country. Appendix B.6 of ESM shows that our results are not driven by
municipalities located in these regions. Furthermore, we exclude either one region or
one source of political corruption, highlighting in Appendix B.7 of ESM that findings
are neither driven by a subset of municipalities within the same region, nor a particular
source of corruption. Finally, Appendix B.8 of ESM excludes all corruption cases for
which there is no corresponding judicial process. We do so to exclude the possibility
that politically motivated accusations of corruption drive our results, finding this not
to be the case.
4.2.2 Research design validity
In our model, the effect on local corruption of municipality i being politically aligned
is actually calculated via the difference for this same municipality being aligned, and
non-aligned:
β = CorrTi j t − Corr NTi j t , (3)
where β denotes the municipality-specific treatment effect, CorrTit denotes the out-
come in the treated group of municipalities, if aligned; and Corr NTit denotes the
outcome in the treated group of municipalities, had they not been aligned (Blundell
and Costa Dias 2009).
Therefore, a necessary assumption to identify the effect of interest, β, is that selec-
tion into treatment is independent of εi t , i.e., alignment is only correlated with the
constant αi . However, one could think of many omitted variables that are perhaps
correlated with both alignment and corruption, potentially invalidating this assump-
tion. Although not directly testable, because the alignment status is obviously not the
same in both groups of municipalities, we can nonetheless implement several tests to
confirm the validity of our identification strategy.
First, we perform a sensitivity analysis by estimating a falsification test. Given that
our empirical strategy is equivalent to a difference-in-differences (DiD) methodol-
ogy, the level of corruption should follow the same trend in aligned and non-aligned
municipalities. Taking advantage of the panel structure of our data, a “fake” treat-
ment group—future alignment—is constructed to this end. Controlling for alignment
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in the present, any estimate on future alignment that is different from 0 would there-
fore provide evidence against the assumption that there are no time varying omitted
factors.22
Table 6 shows estimates, where the models and table structure is akin to those
presented in Table 2. As can be observed, estimates for future alignment are always
close to zero and insignificant, thus offering rather robust support for the validity of our
research design, suggesting also that the common trend assumption is not violated.23
Second, we exploit changes in alignment by coding an additional electoral cycle
preceding our data, namely the period between 1995 and 1999. Employing a DiD
strategy, we then compare municipalities that experienced alignment for the first time
to those that never experienced it during the entire period under observation—i.e.
1995–1999, 1999–2003, and 2003–2007 in the case of the 2007 elections; 1995–1999
and 1999–2003 in the case of the 2003 elections; and 1995–1999 in the case of the
1999 elections. To this end, we exclude all municipalities that experience alignment
in the past. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
Corrit = αi + γt + βFAit + X ′i tδ + εi t (4)
where FAit is a dummy equal to one if the municipality is aligned for the first time.
In this context, the parameter of interest in Eq. (4) captures the effect on corruption of
local governments experiencing alignment for the first time, to those that are always
non-aligned.
Table 7 shows DiD estimates from Eq. (4), with a very similar structure to the one
presented in Table 2.24 Findings show that municipalities experiencing alignment for
the first time are significantly more corrupt than those that never experience political
alignment in our data, further suggesting that time varying unobserved factors do not
play a significant role in explaining the political corruption of local governments in
Spain.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Endemic corruption at the local level is a widely recognized problem in Spanish pol-
itics, and studying the mechanisms through which upper-tier levels of government
can potentially influence such practices is key to understanding the role that political
22 The RDD robustness check presented in Appendix B.1 of ESM actually connects rather well with this
idea, particularly regarding the “ideal” counterfactual group. If we find a significant effect when only
employing municipalities close to the electoral threshold determining the alignment status it is because the
variation in alignment is not driven by other observable determinants.
23 The evolution of corruption trends for treated and control municipalities further suggests no differences.
Result are not reported but available upon request.
24 Note that, due to the large amount of observations droppedwhencreatingboth groups, estimations include
all municipalities above 250 inhabitants. This threshold is chosen to guarantee that all local governments
observed are elected via the same electoral system. Municipalities below 250 inhabitants follow an open
list plurality-at-large system, where voters can choose individual candidates from the same, or different


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































institutions play in its emergence. In an effort to expose an under-explored deter-
minant, this paper investigates the impact of local and regional partisan alignment in
fomenting local government corruption, employing systematic evidence from Spanish
municipalities. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to do so empirically.
Findings show aligned municipalities to be more corrupt than non-aligned ones, an
effect that may be partially induced by absolute majorities at both levels of govern-
ment, and also by higher capital transfers. Regarding the latter, previous literature has
already suggested the allocation of additional transfers to politically aligned munici-
palities in Spain (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro 2008; Curto-Grau et al. 2018), where
we add the important notion that it would also increase local level corruption as an
important by-product. Mechanisms could either be a reduced monitoring of aligned
local governments, or if regional governments are able to influence the judiciary so that
the probability of detection is lower. In the second case, our estimates would actually
represent a lower bound for the effect of partisan alignment on political corruption.
Interestingly, this idea is in line with our finding that absolute majorities at the local
level seem to play a much less important role than absolute majorities at the regional
level.
Conversely, it should be taken into account that our local corruption data are based
on news reports of such practices at the municipal level. If a substantial number of
thesemedia reports are legally unfounded, estimatesmay effectively represent an upper
bound for the effect of partisan alignment on political corruption. Notwithstanding,
previous research for Spain with similar data has not found any evidence of such an
inflationary effect (Costas-Pérez et al. 2012), nor do our robustness checks inAppendix
B.8 of ESM suggest it to be present.
On a positive note, we find that “throwing the rascals out” could be an effective
strategy in curbing the corrupt practices of politically aligned municipalities, but only
if new mayors also come from different parties. In that context, it has been argued
previously that a certain degree of political instability might actually be beneficial in
an economic–institutional sense, making it comparatively more difficult for corrup-
tion, rent-seeking, and special interests to dominate a political system (Olson 1982;
Holcombe 2018). Empirical support for these ideas comes from several cross-country
studies (Berggren et al. 2012, 2015), but to date only tentative evidence exists for such
an effect at the local level (Britto and Fiorin 2020). This could be a fruitful extension for
future enquiries into the topic. Of course, the success of a political replacement strat-
egy in curbing local level corruption will crucially depend on whether the necessary
political agreements can be reached to remove corrupt mayors and their parties from
power. Here, the design of policy reforms to facilitate local government accountability
in Spain would be highly recommendable. Following our results, (i) making voters
better informed through external audits of local governments (Ferraz and Finan 2008)
and (ii) limiting the discretionary power of regional governments with an absolute
majority, especially when allocating capital transfers, could potentially be effective
measures in the quest to reduce political corruption at the Spanish municipal level.
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